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Machiavelli never conceded

Florence during the Renaissance was a tumultuous environment. Many changes were made at the turn of the sixteenth century in Florentine politics, social circles, geography, and art. Of all the events of the Florentine Renaissance, perhaps the most impacting and long-lasting were the published books upon political advice written by Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli spent a great deal of time in various countries, observing and working with government officials. To this end, he had seen many officials rise and fall. His encounters led to his compilations, which naturally mention Piero Soderini. Soderini was elected Gonfaloniere of Florence for life in 1502, and Machiavelli watched him with a keen eye. Machiavelli had the greatest hopes for Florence, and was able to help Soderini through his position as Second Chancellor to the State. At the time, Florence was populated by a sort of caste system, with the highest and mort powerful government positions held by ottimati, or wealthy leading families. Machiavelli never conceded this, but admitted that Soderini’s fall was brought about by his failure to meet the demands of the “citizens with high aspirations”. Only the ottimati were allowed the highest positions, and not every citizen could participate in government offices. After Soderini was elected Gonfaloniere for life, other ottimati realized they would never have the opportunity to hold the highest office in the state. This realization brought about envy, which brought about Soderini’s fall from Florentine politics.
To discuss Soderini’s rise to power, one must consider Soderini’s background. Before Soderini became Gonfaloniere for life, Lorenzo de Medici assumed control of Florence in 1469.
The de Medici bank was a primary instrument in the role of Florentine affairs, even though it was in decline. Since Lorenzo ran the bank, he was easily able to assume leadership of the state. He died in 1492, and Charles VIII of France initiated violent wars in Italy in 1494. Florence’s republican institutions were restored and immediately found to be inadequate to run the state, and were reformed. Savonarola established the Great Council, which was available for participation by all citizens who paid taxes and who held a higher office of state. The first council was instituted in 1494, with eighty citizens in its ranks. This council worked with the Signoria and the Colleagues to appoint ambassadors and war commissioners, among other matters of state importance. Savonarola was executed in 1498, but the Great Council still remained in operation. In 1502, the Great Council decreed that a Gonfaloniere was to be appointed for life to ensure continuity and stability, and elected Piero Soderini to do the job (Moulakis, 154). Initially, many people supported the choice of Soderini for Gonfaloniere, including the Salviati family.
In addition to the changing politics of the time, violence was taking place. Beginning in 1494, the French attempted to invade Italy. In 1499, King Louis of France seized Milan. His plan was to continue south into Naples, but he believed his army was not strong enough to hold Naples permanently against Ferdinand, King of Aragon, who felt he had the right to control Naples. A treaty was made in November of 1500 in which King Louis conceded the southern
half of Italy to Ferdinand in exchange for the northern half. This agreement halted the war between France and Spain over Italy. Italy was in a temporary peace, with the unconquered states of Venice, Florence, and the papacy breathing a sigh of relief (Schevill, p 462).
After Soderini was elected Gonfaloniere in 1502, Florentine life was improved, if only for a short period of time. Many people had high expectations of his ability to ease the instability of Florence, and Soderini was eager to please the population. During the quiet time that ensued after the treaty made between France and Spain, Florence’s own personal problem came looming to the foreground: the rebellious state of Pisa (Schevill, 463). The Pisan rebellion began in 1494 after being under Florentine control since 1406. After the initial conquering, Pisa’s economy was in a terrible state. Florence impaled Pisan citizens with heavy taxes, which did nothing to stabilize her economy. Eventually, after eighty-eight years, Pisa’s economy had begun to flourish again. However, even though Pisa grew under the Florentine green thumb, her citizens still eagerly seized the opportunity to revolt against her former oppressors (Brucker, 179-180). Pisa was the most important of Florence’s subject cities—it provided access to the sea, which made Florence wealthier and more powerful. Not only was Pisa important to Florence’s reputation in Italy, but if Pisa’s rebellion was successful, other subject cities might rebel against

Florence as well. It became the main focus of Florence to regain Pisa, even though Florence lacked the strength to do so (Butters, 32).  
Florence had initially hoped to have French help in the recapture of Pisa. To her dismay, Pisa had already sought aid from the French, promising to obey French rule if the rebellion was successful. Additionally, Pisa appealed to Emperor Maximilian to avoid restoration of subordinance to Florence. Without the help of the French, Soderini hired mercenaries, as was the custom at this time. Twice during the siege, once in 1499 and once again in 1500, the mercenaries had surrounded Pisa and her defeat seemed imminent. However, since the mercenaries lacked the motivation to press their advantage, the city remained strong (Brucker, 180).
Since the mercenaries were unable to regain Pisa, Soderini questioned his fellow statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli, as to what plan of action to take. Under Soderini, Machiavelli had been sent not only to Louis XII and Emperor Maximilian, but also to the smaller Italian rulers to conduct matters of foreign affairs. By this time, Cesare Borgia had risen and fallen, along with Fra Girolamo Savonarola. Machiavelli had observed these cases and gained an appetite for statecraft philosophy. He thought long and hard about the Pisan issue, and had deduced that a change must be made in Florentine military methods. His proposition included a
militia made of Florentine citizens and the complete disposal of mercenaries (Schevill, 463). Although Florence hated mercenaries, Machiavelli’s idea was met with amusement. A citizen army hadn’t been used in Florence since the medieval ages. The mercenaries replaced the army under the impression it would be “more civilized”. However, the situation called for action, so Soderini agreed to proceed with Machiavelli’s plan, but only on an experimental level. They started with small country villages, calling together groups of citizens to undergo military training. The more villages they trained, the more successful and promising the experiment became until, and at last, Soderini brought the proposal before the councils.  On December 6th, 1506, a bill that authorized the founding of a national militia was formally accepted (Schevill, 465).
About this time, other problems were brewing in Florence which weren’t as visible as the struggle with Pisa. Many men of wealthy and prominent families began to oppose Soderini. Led by Bernardo Rucellai, a group of philosophers and patricians met between the years of 1503 and 1506 to discuss the political state of Florence. This group included Francesco da Daicceto, Francesco Vettori, Giovanni Corsi, Giovanni Canacci, Fontius, Cosimo de’ Pazzi, Bindaccio Ricasoli, Pietro Crinito, and some youths who were later to have the leading role in the ejection of Piero Soderini in 1512. Not everyone in this group followed the same political leader or thought; some initially supported Soderini but found the way he ran the city and his neglect of
their advice obnoxious (Butters, 59). Although Bernardo Rucellai never disguised his dislike of Soderini, even going so far as to refuse to hold any government office under Soderini, other Soderini oppositionists flattered and befriended Soderini. This was part of Soderini’s downfall, according to Machiavelli; he allowed his friends to become Squinttini, which allowed them access to act through their jealousy of Soderini’s high rank and hinder any government reformations Soderini proposed (Machiavelli, 327).
Regardless, the state could not forget the rebellious nature of citizens (indeed, rebellion incited the change in the militia), so at first the bill was limited to country citizens. The Council was under the belief that country citizens with weapons were less of a threat to civil war than city residents with weapons. Although the prospect of a civil war was an understandable fear, the limitation not only excluded the leading patriots and beneficiaries of the state from participating in the defense of their country, but it also limited the size of the militia to approximately ten thousand men (Schevill, 465). Because of this, mercenaries were still employed in addition to citizens. However, with every passing year, more citizens joined the militia and fewer mercenaries were needed. By 1509, the national militia had driven Pisa to the breaking point. Although Pisa had been under siege for fifteen years, she had remained strong with help from the enemies of Florence. These powers were preoccupied with an attack on Venice, and Machiavelli saw this as an opportunity to overtake Pisa. Even though he was a lesser official, Machiavelli
headed the Pisan siege. Under his orders, the militia moved in and finally conquered Pisa. Florence was ecstatic; jubilation and praises were given to Machiavelli and also Soderini, who received the majority of the success associated with Pisa and the militia (Schevill, 467).
Naturally, the good times weren’t to last long. In the following year (1510), Pope Julius II called for the liberation of Italy, which essentially entailed a union of all Italian states in opposition to France, the original invader (Schevill, 467). This proved problematic to Florence, since she had extensive interests in France. Although Florence’s main reason to remain on good terms with France was to recapture Pisa, there were other reasons not to upset the French. For example, a large Florentine colony had been founded in Lyons, with many families and businesses rooted and thriving. Looking back into history, Soderini noted the expulsion of Florentine citizens from France when Piero de Medici stood against the French (Butters, 31). For the first time since knowing each other professionally, Machiavelli and Soderini openly disagreed upon which course of action to take. Machiavelli believed Florence should join the Pope and fight against France, whereas Soderini wanted to stay allied with France. His reasoning followed historical examples: France always came out on top. Since Soderini was in control, Florence remained allied with France and denied union with Pope Julius II. At first, this didn’t affect Florence because it didn’t affect the Pope’s agenda: the plan for liberation was not going well. The Pope had been relying on Italian Nationalism, which didn’t exist at the time. Florence
was able to deny Pope Julius II help with immunity (Schevill, 468). However, after a year, the Pope formed his “Holy League” which consisted of the Papacy, Venice, Switzerland and Spain (Brucker, 257). Julius’ decision to include Spain ended up a beneficiary one; in 1512, Spain fought France at Ravenna. Although France won, she had been weakened greatly. Pressure from surrounding Italian states caused France to leave Italy, little by little, until finally France withdrew completely (Schevill, 469).
Although Pope Julius II turned a blind eye to Soderini’s French sympathies when the Holy League was weak, after the defeat of the French in the spring of 1512, it did not escape his notice that Florence wasn’t sympathizing with Italy. A congress consisting of the Holy League and its supporters decided that the Florentine Republic, headed by Soderini and related to the defeated French, was to be abolished and a new government, under the control of the de Medicis, was to be ushered in. Accordingly, the Spanish marched through Tuscany and attacked Florence (Schevill, 469). When news of this plan of attack reached Florence, Machiavelli immediately organized a militia of about twelve thousand men. Most defended Florence, except for three thousand troops who were delegated to defend Prato, which is where the Spanish army first struck. These troops were no match for the Spanish army, and their loss signified the fall of Soderini’s Republic and Machiavelli’s time in Florentine office. After the fall of the Republic, the de Medicis returned to govern Florence once more (Brucker, 183).
Shortly before Prato fell, Soderini called the members of the council together and made them pledge themselves to him in order to defend the popular government. When the people of Florence heard of the Spanish triumph in Prato, everyone looked to their leader, Soderini, for strength and guidance. The people were terrified and disappointed that the Florentine militia had failed them. A commission was immediately dispatched to come to any terms the general of that army would make. A situation like this called for a strong leader, and unfortunately for Florence, Soderini was not that leader. Five young men appeared to Soderini in his rooms, told him to leave, and Soderini did just that. He went all the way to Ragusa, on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, and died in exile. When he died, Machiavelli composed an epitaph for his grave:
La nott che morì Pier Soderini,
L’alma n’andò dell’ Inferno all bocca;
E Pluto le gridò: anima sciocca,
Che Inferno! Va’ nel Limbo dei bambini.
(On the night when Piero Soderini died,
His soul descended to the mouth of hell;
At which Pluto snorted: Silly soul,
Hell is no place for you; your place is in the limbo of babies)
(Schevill, 469-70). Clearly, Machiavelli had strong feelings of disgust towards this inept ruler. A few months after Soderini fled Florence, Machiavelli was removed from his government positions under the new Medici regime. He was forced to provide a guarantee that if he left Florentine territory in the time of a year or entered the Public Palace, he would be forced to pay a fine of one-thousand florins (Stephens, 140).
Although Florence could have avoided this end, the Republic would have fallen one way or another. First, Florence was not a particularly strong state and was easily bullied by France and Spain. If one of those countries had decided to invade Florence (which, in all likelihood, they would have), Florence would have ended (Schevill, 469). Second, Florence was falling apart from the inside. The jealousy of Soderini’s friends and the plots to overthrow Soderini were climaxing, as was previously discussed. Guicciardini explains Soderini’s behavior by arguing that Soderini feared patricians as they would not prove pliable to his will, and that he therefore favoured the citizens of lower intelligence and social position (Butters, 61). If this is so, Soderini should have tried much harder to make the patricians feel validated, as it may have kept the Salviati family from plotting against him. Be that as it may, Soderini could have also tried harder to please the people. As Machiavelli said,
It was surprising to see by what a concourse, not only of distinguished citizens, but also of the populace, he was accompanied to the palace; and while on the way
thither an olive wreath was placed upon his head, to signify that upon him depended the safety and liberty of the city. This, among many similar instances, serves to prove how undesirable it is to enter upon office or power exciting inordinate expectations; for, being unable to fulfill them (many looking for more than it is possible to perform), shame and disappointment are the ordinary results. (Machiavelli, 327)
Many people expected a lot of change from Soderini. He had been elected Gonfalioniere for life because the citizens of Florence thought that giving all the power to a single man for a long period of time would benefit the country’s instability. Soderini showed his incapability to be the change that Florence needed when he neglected to reform the Florentine constitution. Many Ottimati saw this as breaking the pledge Soderini took when sworn into office, especially the Salviati family. The Salviati family believed that Soderini swore an oath to revise the constitution, give legislative form to a new council, and put into effect plans that others had drawn up. Although it is uncertain as to whether Soderini ever took this oath or not, it is quite clear that he never did any of those actions. Another reason the Salviati family had hostility towards Soderini is because he occupied the highest office in the state for life, which left them as an eternal subordinate to him. Apparently, although the idea of a life-long magistrate was good in theory, its practical application caused discontent among the wealthy and high-aspiring families (Butters, 61).
Machiavelli learned many useful things while working with Soderini. For one thing, he realized his passion for a strong and successful state (Chabod, 32). His tactics with the militia did not fail; the strength the state possessed was inadequate for the needs of the state. By the end of Machiavelli’s time in Florence, Machiavelli pitied his native city. In fact, he refers to it several times in his writings and draws numerous examples from Pisa, Florence, and Soderini himself. He concluded that the Republic of Soderini was weak because the Ottimati were as corrupt as the rest of society (Chabod, 81).
One of the notions in The Prince seems to obviously stem from the example of Piero Soderini, and this is the notion of whether it is better to be feared than loved. Initially, Machiavelli liked Soderini very much: he was patient, hard working, and kind. However, when Soderini came into power, he wanted to be loved by the entire state. For example, Soderini knew in advance of the schemes of the younger group that eventually overthrew him, and yet he did nothing to stop them. This may have been because he was too benevolent or because he underestimated them.  he may have also hoped that patience would resolve his problems, or perhaps he felt it too dangerous to attack. Either way, if the community feared Soderini, secret plots would have never been made against him (Butters, 62).

Another notion that seems to parallel to Soderini is the notion Machiavelli contrived about mercenary troops. Although it was well-known before Soderini tried to recapture Pisa that mercenaries were unreliable, no one had proposed any changes. Machiavelli did, and he was given the opportunity to observe the affects that a national militia had not only on the reliability of troops, but also on the morale of the citizens.
If Machiavelli had never held office under Soderini, he would never have had the opportunity to compose The Prince. While in exile, he continued his political career, if only his head. Through Soderini, Machiavelli gained access to a republican experiment in government, and walked away from the experience a wiser man. Soderini, on the other hand, walked away a coward. Although one man stands out in the history books and the other blends into the pages, both men impacted each other’s lives.